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Abstract
A successful organization – or Broadway production – needs the right team.
A potential issue is that an existing synergy between complementary agents
(or assets) can reduce the marginal return of effort, creating a disincentive to
invest. While agents always prefer to be in a team of complementary workers,
a principal may wish to use non-complementary agents; this can occur if the
loss from lower investment is sufficiently large. A principal, however, may opt
for non-complementary agents when complementary workers would produce
greater surplus. These insights have implications for job rotation, the central-
ization versus decentralization of decision making and mergers.
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1 Introduction
What does it take for success on Broadway? A Broadway production needs: a com-
poser; a lyricist; a librettist who writes the dialogue and plot; a choreographer; a
director; and a producer. But who should fulfill these roles? Analyzing Broadway
shows between 1877 and 1990, Uzzi & Spiro (2005) find that the financial and criti-
cal success is increasing in the number of the team members who previously worked
together (incumbents), but only up to a point; too many incumbents decrease the
likelihood of a production’s success. Therefore, the most successful teams comprise
of some incumbents, but also some newcomers.
Incumbents have some natural advantages. They understand how each other
works; they know others’ strengths, weaknesses and communication idiosyncracies.
Familiar team members probably have a better sense of what the others will like and
dislike, helping agents to avoid proposing and arguing for ideas that will never be
part of the final product. Given the advantage of using incumbents, why use new-
comers? Uzzi & Spiro (2005) emphasize that new team members bring fresh ideas to
the collaborative effort, increasing overall quality. We focus on a similar rationale for
using unfamiliar, or inherently less complementary, team members; complementarity
can decrease the incentive for agents to invest, ultimately reducing total output (or
quality). Using this framework, we examine the preferred team composition (com-
plements or non-complements) for the principal and the teammates themselves, and
apply our findings to a variety of applications.
To analyze the choice of team composition we make two key assumptions: con-
tracts are incomplete, creating an underlying hold-up problem; and final output de-
pends on both the potential complementarities between workers and the efforts they
make. Importantly, in equilibrium, each worker’s choice of effort depends on the
potential synergy between team members.
In our model, a principal decides whether a team is made up of two complementary
or independent (non-complementary) agents. Once chosen, each team member makes
a non-contractible effort. After these investments are sunk, all parties negotiate
and receive their share of ex post surplus. Complementary workers, by their very
nature, produce greater output for any given level of effort. On the other hand
independent agents, perhaps because they have never worked together before, have
no intrinsic synergy between them. We make the following important assumption:
the additional surplus generated using complementary agents is decreasing in worker
effort. As a result, there is a tradeoff when choosing the team; while complementary
workers (incumbents) produce more surplus for any given level of effort, independent
workers (newcomers) put in more effort in equilibrium. This tradeoff gives rise to
several results. First, the (second-best) welfare maximizing team could include either
complementary or independent workers. Second, a principal may opt for a team of
either complementary or independent workers. Furthermore, while a principal will
never choose complementary workers when independent workers produce more net
surplus, a principal could opt for independent workers too often, failing to maximize
welfare. Third, workers themselves always prefer teams of complementary agents,
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even when welfare is maximized with independents.
Our model is essentially a moral hazard in teams model (see Alchain & Dem-
setz 1972, Holmstrom 1982 and Che & Yoo 2001, for example). Given the externality
between team members, there is always underinvestment in effort. However, in our
paper the team structure also affects agents’ equilibrium efforts; consequently, the
composition of the team needs to take into account its effect on incentives. Our anal-
ysis suggests that, if incumbents are complementary, using familiar workers could
foster (relative) indolence. If this is the case, choosing non-complementary (unfa-
miliar) agents could be preferred, as such an arrangement leads to greater levels of
effort.1
This idea has much in common with what social psychologists refer to as ‘social
loafing’ or the ‘Ringelmann effect’ (see West 2004), a phenomenon observed in exper-
iments by Ringelmann in the late 19th Century. Ringelmann found that people put
in 75 per cent of the effort pulling a rope when they thought they were a member of
a team of seven (they were blindfolded) compared with their effort as an individual
undertaking the same activity (see Kravitz and Martin 1986).2 This literature also
makes a second observation: the types of individuals in the group make a difference
to observed effort. For instance, Stroebe et al (1996) examine teams working on com-
plex problems. While team performance exceeded that of individuals, performance
was further improved when high-ability team members thought they were matched
with a low-ability partner.3 The predictions of our model are consistent with both
of these findings: (i) people underinvest when they work as part of a team; and (ii)
effort and output can be lower when complementary (high-ability) individuals are
paired together relative to when there is a team of non-complements (one high- and
one low-ability worker).
An existing literature – Segal (1999, 2003), Bernstein and Winter (2012) and
Winter (2004, 2006), for example – examine incentive contract design when there are
externalities between agents. These models typically investigate optimal contracting
when the potential externalities are fixed (that is, they do not vary with effort). In
contrast to most of these models, we focus on the tradeoff between effort and the
relationship between agents, so that externality varies endogenously in equilibrium.
The paper in this literature most similar to ours is Winter (2012), who examines how
the structure of information inside a firm affects the agents’ optimal incentive con-
tracts. Specifically, he finds that creating an environment with greater information is
1Team membership has also been explained by the technological complementarities between
tasks (Brickley et al 2009) or arising from a multi-tasking incentive problem (see Holmstrom &
Milgrom 1991 and Corts 2006, for example).
2Other experiments have found similar effects: people shouted in a team with only 74 per cent
of the effort as they did individually (Ingham et al 1974); when solving mathematical problems
individuals took on average five minutes, groups of 2 individuals took an average of 3-and-a-half
minutes per-person and groups of 4 averaged 12 minutes per-person (Shaw 1932).
3Social psychologists have invoked various explanations for this phenomenon, ranging from in-
dividuals feeling that they would be embarrassed if it were revealed they put in more effort than
others, coordination failures, loud talkers drowning out others or that individuals reduce their effort
if they feel it will not be adequately recognized (West 2004).
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beneficial when agents’ efforts are complementary. This is because the dissemination
of agent’s effort (or lack thereof) can allow for effective punishment. The similarities
in the two papers are that the work environment affects investment incentives. In
Winter (2012) it is the flows of information; in our model it is the composition of the
team. One key difference is that Winter explicitly considers incentive contracts based
on output, whereas ours is an incomplete contract model in which each party’s share
of surplus arises from ex post renegotiation.
In a different context, Franco et al (2011) consider how worker types are matched,
when this choice affects the optimal incentive contracts, which depend on type and
output. They find that a principal might prefer to forgo technological complementar-
ities (by not matching two low-cost workers together) if this allows a better outcome
in terms of effort and the cost of incentive compensation.4 Their result – that positive
associated matching need not hold once the effort and incentive contracts are con-
sidered – is a parallel result to our counterintuitive result that non-complementary
workers might be preferred. Moreover, it is worth noting that both Franco et al (2011)
and our paper assume observable worker type, unlike many other matching models
in which agent type is unobservable (such as in Jeon 1996, Newman 2007 and Thiele
& Wambach 1999).
Winter (2009) studies a related moral hazard in teams problem, in which higher
incentives can induce lower efforts – a phenomenon he calls incentive reversal. This
can occur when a larger payoff induces one agent to always invest, which in turn may
generate an opportunity for other agents to free-ride.5 We can also generate incentive
reversal in our model, although we have a different mechanism at play. When agents
are complementary there is greater surplus for any given level of effort than with non-
complements; this is akin to larger payoffs studied in Winter (2009). This additional
surplus may lead complementary workers to put in less effort, which is similar to
incentive reversal. However, in our paper we go further and show that in equilibrium
complementary agents, despite their natural synergy, can produce (and share) less
output than independents. That is, not only do complementary agents exert less
effort but they produce less output despite having a natural synergy between them.
We also draw on several other streams of literature. In particular, the model
applies to the joint use or co-location of assets. Using some assets together rather
than separately can generate an additional natural synergy, but this could also change
parties’ incentives to engage in ex ante investment. The standard predictions in the
property-rights models (Hart and Moore 1990 and Hart 1995 for example) suggest that
complementary assets should be owned together, so as to provide the best possible
incentives for ex ante investment. Our model generates results in the same vein as
Bel (2012), who finds that complementary assets need not be owned together when
assets are substitutes at the margin.
There are many applications of our model. The model is directly applicable to
team composition and job rotation.6 Job rotation, by its very nature, breaks up old
4Kaya & Vereshchagina (2010) make similar point regarding moral hazard in partnerships.
5Klor et al (2012) investigates incentive reversal further through a series of experiments.
6Other explanations for job rotation include eliciting information from agents (Arya & Mitten-
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relationship in teams and makes workers start afresh with at least some new mem-
bers. This practice is used by many consulting firms; McKinsey & Company, for
example, insists on rotating senior management roles. Our model suggests there are
potential benefits from committing to a job-rotation policy, as the agents, if left to
their own devices, will always choose to be paired with a complementary partner
even if the independent agents produce more. This could also be suggestive as to
why some firms use predetermined rotation rules, so as to avoid influence costs (Mil-
grom & Roberts 1990). In a similar manner to the Broadway study mentioned above,
Guimera et al (2005) find that the inclusion of newcomers in research teams increases
the probability of a successful scientific collaboration in social psychology, economics,
ecology and astronomy. In another situation, some airlines integrate a permutation
constraint in their cabin crew assignment algorithm that prevents familiar pilots from
being assigned together on the same flight.7 There is likely to be a potential com-
plementarity between familiar workers – for instance, crew members who know each
other well can probably communicate more easily – but these airlines explicitly forgo
this synergy. Crew that know each other well may be dissuaded from undertaking
the same level of effort when teamed with each other (checking and cross checking
and so on) than when teamed up with a stranger. With lower effort, the outcome
(in terms of safety incidents) could be worse when complementary agents are paired
together, despite the natural synergy.
The tradeoff we present also has implications for the allocation of decision-making
rights. As noted, if they can, agents tend to choose to work with other complementary
agents too often, whereas a principal can have too much incentive to choose indepen-
dent agents. This has implications for how the choice of agents, or the aggregation of
assets, is made. If encouraging effort is crucial, centralization could be preferred; the
principal can commit to allocating independent agents to the task when the agents
themselves cannot do so. For example, one landlord typically determines the tenants
in a strip mall or a shopping mall. A Broadway production could also use centralized
decision making, having a project leader tasked with assembling the team. A de-
centralized decision-making structure could be preferred when capturing the intrinsic
synergy between agents or assets is relatively more important than inducing greater
effort. Agents often choose their team-mates in rock bands and study groups, and the
co-location decision is decentralized for many businesses like car lots and restaurants.
Finally, there have been some spectacular M&A failures - for example AT&T/NCR,
Quaker Oats/Snapple and AOL/Time Warner. In all these cases the participants
expected significant synergies that did not eventuate. The failure of M&As is con-
ventionally attributed to cultural differences between the two firms or a failure to
conduct proper due diligence. While these factors are undoubtedly important, they
do not explain the observation that ‘the acquiring firms in ‘related’ mergers do not
benefit or are actually worse off compared to unrelated as well as horizontal mergers’
(Chatterjee 2007). Our model suggests that – just like high-ability complementary
dorf 2004), to overcome boredom of workers and to limit scope for corruption (Choi & Thum 2003).
7Anonymous industry source.
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individuals being paired together – it is exactly the mergers that seem to have the
greatest degree of complementarity between the assets that can create a disincentive
to invest, leading to lower surplus overall.
2 The Model
Consider a model with principal P and two agents, A1 and A2.
8 P owns an asset that
is necessary for production and the two agents can use this asset to produce the final
output or surplus. Moreover, each agent can expend some specific effort ei ∈ [0, ei)
9,
for i = 1, 2, with a cost of Ci(ei), where: Ci(0) = 0; Ci(ei) is twice differentiable;
and strictly increasing and strictly convex in ei. Thus, the marginal cost of effort is
increasing with the level of investment, as summarized in Assumption 1.
Assumption 1. The cost function Ci(ei) is non-negative, twice differentiable, strictly
increasing in ei and strictly convex; i.e., Ci(ei) ≥ 0, Ci(0) = 0, C
′
i(ei) > 0 and C
′′
i (ei) >
0 for ei ∈ [0, ei) with C
′
i(0) = 0 and limei→ei C
′
i(ei) =∞ for i = 1, 2.
Each agent, making his investment ei and working with the asset, can generate
individual surplus of vi(ei) for i = 1, 2, respectively, as detailed below.
Assumption 2. The surplus vi is a non-negative, increasing and concave production
function; that is, vi(ei) ≥ 0, vi(0) = 0, v
′
i(ei) ≥ 0 and v
′′
i (ei) ≤ 0 for i = 1, 2.
The agents can also work together as a team. If the agents work together they
produce a joint surplus v12, where v12(e1, e2) ≥ v1(e1) + v(e2). The additional sur-
plus produced from joint rather than individual production is the potential synergy
S(e1, e2) between the two parties. The synergy between the agents is defined below.
This also allows us to define complementary and independent agents.
Definition 1. S(e1, e2) = v12(e1, e2)− v1(e1)− v(e2) represents the synergy between
the two agents, who can be: (a) complementary if S(e1, e2) ≥ 0 ∀ e1, e2 and S(0, 0) >
0; or (b) independent if S(e1, e2) ≡ 0.
We also make the following assumption regarding the nature of the synergy be-
tween agents.
Assumption 3.
∂S(e1,e2)
∂ei
≤ 0 for i = 1, 2.
Assumption 3 implies that the synergy between the two complementary agents
is non-increasing in their effort; that is, efforts are substitutes at the margin. For
instance, consider the case of two agents who know each other very well. Because
they understand each other they can coordinate their activities with relatively low
effort. On the other hand, consider two team members who do not know each other.
8This model can be extended both in terms of the number of agents and the exact nature of the
synergies between them.
9Note that ei > 0 and it is possible that ei =∞.
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Given they have no background, there is no history or previous working relationship
the two can rely on. This means there will be a few difficulties learning how to work
together, and for a given level of effort the two strangers will produce less output
than two people who are used to working together. If two strangers both put in
effort, however, they can learn about the other agent’s strengths, weaknesses, how
they communicate, and so on. As the two strangers put in more effort, the relative
advantage of the incumbents, while still there, becomes smaller.
Finally, we would like the profit-maximization problem when agents work together
to be well defined, which requires that v12 is concave. This is summarized below.
Assumption 4. v12 is non-negative, increasing and concave; that is v12(e1, e2) ≥ 0,
∂v12(e1,e2)
∂ei
≥ 0, ∂
2v12(e1,e2)
∂e2
i
≤ 0 for i = 1, 2 and ∂
2v12(e1,e2)
∂e2
1
∂2v12(e1,e2)
∂e2
2
−
(
∂2v12(e1,e2)
∂e1∂e2
)2
≥ 0.
Note that for Assumption 4 to hold it is sufficient (but not necessary) that the
synergy between two complementary agents is relatively small compared with the
individual surpluses of v1 and v2. It is also sufficient that the synergy itself is a
concave function.
2.1 Timing and investment solution
The game has the following timing. At date 0, the type of workers on the team is
chosen; specifically, it is decided whether the team should comprise of complementary
or independent agents. At date 1, these agents choose their level of relationship-
specific non-contractible effort. Finally, at date 2, the agents bargain over the share
of surplus. Figure 1 summarizes the timing.
666
t=0
• workers
allocated
• e1 and e2 chosen
t=1 t=2
• bargaining
over surplus
• trade
Figure 1: Timing of the game
Following the literature, we assume that ex post surplus is distributed according
to the Shapley value. Furthermore, no date 1 variable is contractible at date 0. Let M
be the sub-coalition of the grand coalition of all N = 3 agents. Following bargaining,
each party j = 1, 2, P receives a share of ex post surplus Bj(e1, e2) so that the sum
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of the distributed shares is equal to the total available surplus in the grand coalition,
so that
∑
j∈N
Bj(e1, e2) = v12(e1, e2). (1)
Following Hart and Moore (1990), the Shapley value Bj(e1, e2) is defined as:
Definition 2. Party j′s share of gross surplus is given by the Shapley value
Bj(e1, e2) =
∑
M |i∈M
p(M)[v(M | e1, e2)− v(M\{i} | e1, e2)], (2)
where p(M) = (|M |−1)!(|N |−|M |)!
(|N |)!
.
Note that because the game is convex the Shapley value is always in the core.10
3 The incentives to invest
There will be different incentives to invest, depending on whether the agents are
independent or complementary. In this section we compare investment incentives
and the welfare implications of the two alternative team structures. To provide a
benchmark for these comparisons, we first analyze the first-best team structure.
3.1 First-best incentives
Let us compare the first-best incentives and the choice between complementary and
independent agents. The first-best investments in the case of complementary workers
solve:
∂vi(ei)
∂ei
+
∂S(e1, e2)
∂ei
=
∂Ci(ei)
∂ei
, ∀ i = 1, 2. (3)
The first-best investments in the case of independent workers are:
∂vi(ei)
∂ei
=
∂Ci(ei)
∂ei
, ∀ i = 1, 2. (4)
The solution for each agent’s investment choice exists and is unique given Assumptions
1,2 and 4. Note that, given S(e1, e2) ≥ 0 ∀ e1, e2, both total and net surplus are
always weakly higher with complementary rather than with independent agents. This
means net surplus is maximized using complementary agents.
Result 1. The first-best outcome always entails using complementary rather than
independent agents.
10See Osbourne and Rubinstein (1990, exercise 295.5), for example.
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Proof. The proof follows from the discussion above.
As S ≥ 0, total surplus is weakly higher with complementary agents – for any
level of effort, a switch to complements from independent agents will increase gross
surplus without altering costs. If an enforceable contract could be written on effort,
it would always be first-best optimal to use complementary agents.
3.2 Second-best incentives
However, a complete contract cannot always be written. Now consider the invest-
ment decision of the two workers, taking into account ex post bargaining. Since the
principal is indispensable and at least one of the agents is indispensable11, the ex ante
payoff given by the Shapley value for each agent is12:
1
2
vi(ei) +
1
3
S(e1, e2)− Ci(ei), ∀ i = 1, 2. (5)
Anticipating renegotiation, the complementary agents will set their effort to maxi-
mize their ex ante payoff. The equilibrium levels of effort eC1 and e
C
2 solve the following
first-order conditions:
1
2
v′i(ei) +
1
3
∂S(e1, e2)
∂ei
=
∂Ci(ei)
∂ei
, ∀ i = 1, 2. (6)
On the other hand, if the agents are independent, their equilibrium levels of in-
vestment eI1 and e
I
2 are given by:
1
2
v′i(ei) =
∂Ci(ei)
∂ei
, ∀ i = 1, 2. (7)
Similar to the first-best case, the solution for each agent’s investment choice exists
and is unique due to Assumptions 1,2 and 4. Moreover, given Assumptions 2 and 3
it follows that:
eCi ≤ e
I
i , ∀ i = 1, 2, (8)
as summarized below.
Result 2. An agent exerts a lower level of effort when paired with a complementary
rather than an independent agent; that is, eCi ≤ e
I
i , ∀ i = 1, 2.
This leads to the following Corollary that we will make use of in our subsequent
analysis.
Corollary 1. ∆Ci(ei) = Ci(e
I
i )− Ci(e
C
i ) ∀ i = 1, 2 is always non-negative.
11An assumption that the two team members are indispensable would alter the shares each party
receives but leads to the same qualitative tradeoffs.
12See the Appendix for a detailed derivation of the shares of gross surplus for the agents and the
principal.
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The equilibrium effort - and effort cost - is always greater for an agent paired
with an independent rather than with another complementary worker. The marginal
return from effort is lower with complementary agents; this is because the synergy S
– the advantage of complementary workers over their independent alternatives – is
decreasing in effort (Assumption 3).
3.3 The principal’s choice of team composition
We now consider the principal’s choice of team-mates. It follows that, when the
surplus generated by greater effort is relatively more important than protecting the
intrinsic synergy between complementary workers, the ex post surplus may be higher
with independent rather than with complementary agents. At date 0, the principal
will choose to select two complementary (independent) agents if and only if:
1
2
vI1 +
1
2
vI2 ≤ (≥)
1
2
vC1 +
1
2
vC2 +
1
3
SC , (9)
where SC is defined as the synergy S generated when complementary agents invest
eC1 and e
C
2 .
13 We also simplify notation by indicating the effort level as a superscript
in the value function.
Now consider the payoff to each agent when matched with either a complementary
or independent co-worker. Using a revealed-preference argument, if an agent is paired
with a complementary partner, the agent i’s payoff will be at least as large with a
choice of effort eCi rather than with a choice of e
I
i . The same argument can be made
for an agent on an independent team – eIi yields at least as much return to an agent
in an independent team as does exerting eCi . Using this logic, the rational choice of
individual i ensures that:
1
2
vIi +
1
3
S(eI1, e
C
2 )− Ci(e
I
i ) ≤
1
2
vCi +
1
3
SC − Ci(e
C
i ), ∀ i = 1, 2; (10)
and
1
2
vIi − Ci(e
I
i ) ≥
1
2
vCi − Ci(e
C
i ), ∀ i = 1, 2. (11)
Summing for both agents, these two conditions are:
1
2
vI1 +
1
2
vI2 +
2
3
S(eI1, e
C
2 )−∆C1(e1)−∆C2(e2) ≤
1
2
vC1 +
1
2
vC2 +
2
3
SC (12)
and
1
2
vI1 +
1
2
vI2 −∆C1(e1)−∆C2(e2) ≥
1
2
vC1 +
1
2
vC2 . (13)
Comparing (9) and (12), a sufficient condition for choosing complementary agents
is:
13Note that for ease of exposition we allow the principal to choose either team structure if the
equation holds with equality.
10
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≤
2
3
S(eI1, e
C
2 )−
1
3
SC . (14)
Given Assumption 3, it follows that S(eI1, e
C
2 ) ≥ S
I , where SI is the synergy
generated when complementary agents invest eI1 and e
I
2. This means the following
condition ensures that (14) is satisfied
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≤
2
3
SI −
1
3
SC . (15)
For convenience this condition can be rewritten as
X ≤
2
3
Y −
1
3
, (16)
where we introduce the following notation X = ∆C1(e1)+∆C2(e2)
SC
and Y = S
I
SC
.
Comparing (9) and (13), it turns out that a sufficient condition for choosing in-
dependent workers is:
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≥
1
3
SC , (17)
which is
X ≥
1
3
. (18)
In summary, we have outlined the sufficient conditions required for the principal
to use complementary agents and, secondly, when she will choose independent agents.
These conditions are detailed in the following result.
Result 3. A sufficient condition for the principal to choose complementary agent is
that ∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≤
2
3
SI − 1
3
SC , while the sufficient condition for principal to
choose independent agents is that ∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≥
1
3
SC .
Figure 2 shows the potential level of output with the two alternative team struc-
tures. Focusing on e1 (and suppressing the role of e2 for exposition), v12 is the
potential surplus with complementary agents, while v1 + v2 is the potential surplus
with independent agents. From Assumption 3, the additional surplus that comple-
mentary agents generate is monotonically decreasing in effort e1. This means that
the marginal return of e1 is less for complementary workers, and their equilibrium
investment level is eC1 < e
I
1. Hence there is a tradeoff; the intrinsic synergy with
complementary workers must be compared with the additional surplus generated by
higher effort put forth by independent agents. Critically, this comparison needs to be
made at the equilibrium levels of effort for the two alternatives.
The principal will choose to allocate the type of agents that will maximize her
return, which is her share of gross surplus at renegotiation, see equation (9). It is
possible, as shown in Figure 2, that the effort effect with independent agents dom-
inates the synergy effect with complementary agents, so the principal would opt to
use independent workers.
11
vI
v
1 
+ v
2
v
12
SI
v*
vc
SC C1(e1)
c I
 C
1
* e
1e1 e1 e1
Figure 2: Surplus with complementary and independent workers
It is worth comparing this result with Proposition 3 in Che and Yoo (2001). They
find that a principal will opt for individual rather than team production if there is no
synergy between the workers. In contrast, our result suggests that a principal might
opt for independent agents even when a potential synergy exists, provided there is a
sufficient change in effort.
3.4 The agents’ choice of team structure
We now turn to the preferences of the agents themselves as to the makeup of their
team. Agent i will choose to be paired with a complementary agent if:
1
2
vIi −∆Ci(ei) ≤
1
2
vCi +
1
3
SC (19)
for i = 1, 2. Given (10), this inequality will always hold, ensuring that the agents
themselves will always want to be paired with a complementary partner.
Result 4. Agents always want to be in a team with complementary agents.
Agents always prefer complementary workers in their team, and this is true regard-
less as to the type of structure (complements or independents) that produce greater
surplus. Being paired with a complementary partner allows an agent to enjoy their
share of the intrinsic synergy. It also allows the agents to reduce their effort, of which
they receive the full savings.
3.5 Second-best optimal choice of team structure
We show earlier that a principal might choose to use independent agents, forgoing a
intrinsic synergy between complementary team members. Now we consider the choice
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of team composition made by a social planner, whose goal is to maximize (second-
best) total welfare. In particular, this allows us to compare the welfare maximizing
team composition to the principal’s choice.
Welfare will be higher with complementary (independent) team members if and
only if:
vI1 + v
I
2 − C1(e
I
1)− C2(e
I
2) ≤ (≥)v
C
1 + v
C
2 + S
C − C1(e
C
1 )− C2(e
C
2 ). (20)
Comparing (12) and (20), it turns out that a sufficient condition for welfare to
increase with complementary team members is:
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≤
4
3
S(eI1, e
C
2 )−
1
3
SC . (21)
Given Assumption 3, it follows that S(eI1, e
C
2 ) ≥ S
I . Using the same argument as
above, if
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≤
4
3
SI −
1
3
SC (22)
then (21) is satisfied. Inequality (22) can be rewritten as
X ≤
4
3
Y −
1
3
. (23)
Comparing (13) and (20), it turns out that a sufficient condition for welfare to
increase with independent team members is:
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≥ S
C , (24)
or that
X ≥ 1. (25)
From the arguments above, we construct sufficient conditions for when indepen-
dent or complementary agents maximize welfare, summarized in the result below.
Result 5. A sufficient condition for total welfare to be higher with complementary
rather than independent agents is that ∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≤
4
3
SI − 1
3
SC , while a
sufficient condition for total welfare to be higher with independent agents is that
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≥ S
C .
We are now in a position to compare the principal’s choice of team composition
(Result 3) with the welfare maximizing one (Result 5). To help analyze this issue,
consider Figure 3 that outlines various regions for Y = S
I
SC
, the relative synergy
produced with either independent or complementary agents, and X = ∆C1(e1)+∆C2(e2)
SC
,
the increase in costs associated with using independent rather than complementary
agents relative to the synergy in equilibrium with complementary agents. Note that
we are only interested in area Y ≤ 1 because SI ≤ SC , and X ≥ 0 because of
Corollary 1.
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Figure 3: Total welfare and firm choice of independent or complementary workers
In the Figure, in region A the principal will always choose complementary agents.
The vertical line X = 1
3
indicates the necessary condition for complementary agents
to be chosen by the principal (more precisely X ≤ 1
3
); the principal will only ever
choose complementary agents (but not necessarily will) in regions A, B and C. From
the diagram, we can also see that the sufficient condition for the principal to opt for
independent agents is to be in regions D, E and F (where X ≥ 1
3
).
From a social planner’s perspective, the diagonal line running from Y = 1
4
indicates
the sufficient conditions required for complementary agents to produce greater net
surplus in equilibrium; complementary agents are required to maximize surplus in
regions A, B and D. The sufficient condition for independent agents to maximize
welfare is satisfied in region F (where X ≥ 1).
Note in region D, the principal will choose a team of independent workers, but
the welfare-maximizing choice is for complementary agents to be used. From a social
welfare point of view, the principal opts for the wrong type of workers. This point is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When X ≥ 1
3
and 1 ≥ Y ≥ 3
4
X + 1
4
hold, the principal chooses
independent agents, even though (second-best) welfare is maximized by using comple-
mentary agents.
Proof. The proof follows from the discussion above.
This suggests that, for some parameter values the principal has too much propen-
sity to choose independent workers. This arises because the principal considers
her share of ex post surplus but does not consider the increase in ex ante costs,
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2), as these costs are borne by the agents. If the increase in costs
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is relatively high as compared with the decrease in the size of the synergy between
the independent and complementary levels of effort, the principal tends to choose
independent workers too often.
To capture more insights from our general setup, we now consider the case in
which agents’ efforts are perfect substitutes and the synergy is a concave function.
3.6 Perfect substitutes with concave synergy
In this subsection consider the case when the synergy only depends on the total effort
of the team; that is, it is assumed that the efforts are perfect substitutes.
Assumption 5. S(e1, e2) = S(e1 + e2).
In addition, we assume that the synergy S is a concave function; that is, the
synergy decreases more quickly with an increase in effort ei for i = 1, 2.
Assumption 6.
∂S2(e1,e2)
∂e2
1
= ∂S
2(e1,e2)
∂e2
2
= ∂S
2(e1,e2)
∂e1∂e2
≤ 0.
With the aid of these assumptions it is possible to give a more precise lower bound
for S(eI1, e
C
2 ). Specifically,
S(eI1, e
C
2 ) ≥
SI + SC
2
. (26)
Given (26), condition (14) will be satisfied if
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≤
SI + SC
3
−
1
3
SC . (27)
Furthermore, (27) can be rewritten as
X ≤
Y
3
. (28)
Similarly, for (21) to hold it is necessary that
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≤
2(SI + SC)
3
−
1
3
SC , (29)
which can be simplified to
X ≤
2Y + 1
3
. (30)
Figure 4 has the same structure as Figure 3 above, although Assumptions 5 and
6 allow us to more precisely characterize the various parameter regions. In region
A the principal will always choose complementary agents. The vertical line X =
1
3
indicates the necessary condition for complementary agents to be chosen by the
principal (regions A and B). This also indicates that the sufficient condition for the
principal to opt for independent agents is to be in regions C, D or E (where X ≥ 1
3
).
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Figure 4: Firm choice with perfect substitutable efforts and concave synergy
From a social planner’s perspective, the diagonal line running from X = 1
3
indi-
cates the sufficient condition required for complementary agents to produce greater
welfare in equilibrium; complementary agents are required to maximize welfare in
regions A, B and C. Being in region E where X ≥ 1 is sufficient for independent
agents to maximize welfare.
In region C, the principal will choose a team of independent workers, but comple-
mentary agents are welfare-maximizing. Note also that the necessary condition for
the principal to choose complementary agents, and the sufficient condition for com-
plementary agents to maximize welfare do not intersect for positive values of Y . This
means, as we discuss in subsection 3.7 below, if a principal chooses complementary
agents, it can never be the case that independent agents maximize social welfare.
The following example highlights some of the results of the previous discussion.
Example 1
Assume that the coalition containing only one agent i and the principal generates
a surplus of vi = 2αei, while the coalition containing both agents and the principal
generates additional surplus of S = max[3β(A − (e1 + e2)
2), 0]. The costs for both
agents are Ci(ei) = αe
2
i for i = 1, 2. Note that when α > 0, β > 0 and A > 1
Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied. In the first-best case, the optimal efforts are
e∗1 = e
∗
2 =
{ α
α+6β
, if A ≥ 4α
α+6β
;
1, if A < 4α
α+6β
.
(31)
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In the case of complementary agents, the optimal efforts solve the following system:
{
α− 2β(e1 + e2) = 2αe1,
α− 2β(e1 + e2) = 2αe2.
(32)
This gives eC1 = e
C
2 =
α
2α+4β
< 1
2
. From equation 7, with independent agents the
optimal efforts are eI1 = e
I
2 =
1
2
.
Given these equilibrium efforts, we can calculate SC = 3β(A− γ2), SI = 3β(A−
1), and ∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) =
1
2
α(1 − γ2), where γ = α
α+2β
. This gives X =
∆C1(e1)+∆C2(e2)
SC
= γ(1+γ)
3(A−γ2)
and Y = SI/SC = A−1
A−γ2
. Dividing X by 1 − Y and simpli-
fying yields Y = 1− 3(1−γ)
γ
X . Note that, as 0 < γ < 1, all the points with 0 < Y < 1
and X > 0 are feasible for this specification.
Given the specific functions used, the actual condition for the principal to choose
complementary agents (condition 9) is Y ≥ 18X
2−1
6X−1
, illustrated in Figure 4 by the
dashed line that cuts area B. Similarly, the actual condition for which complementary
workers maximize welfare (condition 20) is Y ≥ 6X
2−3X−1
3X−1
, the dashed line cutting
area D. 
3.7 Principal’s choice of a complementary team and total
welfare
Next, consider the case when the principal opts to use complementary workers. As
it turns out, if the principal chooses complementary agents it is always the case that
complementary agents is the team composition that maximizes social welfare. The
intuition for this can be demonstrated with the aid of Figure 2. The principal is
concerned about their share of gross surplus (from their Shapley value) from the two
alternatives, respectively. If the principal anticipates a higher payoff with complemen-
tary agents it must be the case that complements also maximize net surplus because
not only is vC > vI , but effort costs are also lower with complements (Corollary 1).
This result is captured in Figure 4 when we consider the case of perfectly substi-
tutable efforts; the two dashed lines do not intersect. This discussion is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Whenever a principal chooses complementary agents in equilibrium,
a social planner would have also chosen complementary agents; that is using comple-
mentary agents is (second-best) welfare maximizing.
Proof. See Appendix.
In our framework, if we observe a principal opting for complementary agents, this
choice also maximize (second-best) welfare. But as noted in subsection 3.4, agents
always prefer complements. In this case there is no difference between a centralized
(principal) or decentralized (agents-based) decision about team composition; both
decision-making structure yield the same outcome.
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4 Incentive reversal
As noted in the Introduction, Winter (2009) shows the possibility of incentive reversal
in which an increase in the payoffs (incentives) can result in most agents reducing
their effort. In this section we show that we can produce equivalent results. In
our framework, incentive reversal would be when an improvement in the production
technology, such that there is a proportional increase in either one of the surpluses
or the synergy generated for every level of effort, leads to a decrease in equilibrium
efforts of all agents. To make a more direct comparison with Winter (2009), we relax
Assumption 3, allowing efforts to be either complements or substitutes at the margin.
Let us first establish the conditions when incentive reversal cannot occur in equi-
librium, a parallel result to Proposition 1 in Winter (2009). This is outlined in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3. Equilibrium efforts are immune to incentive reversal if efforts are
complements at the margin.
Proof. See Appendix.
In Winter (2009), incentive reversal relies on increasing returns with respect to
agents’ efforts and is not possible with decreasing returns. Here, we only consider the
case of decreasing returns to scale. In our model, as noted in Proposition 3, incentive
reversal will not be observed if efforts are complementary at the margin. Incentive
reversal is possible in our framework, however, if efforts are not complementary at
the margin. This is illustrated in the Example below. Moreover, we show that in
equilibrium incentive reversal can reduce total welfare.
Example 2
Let us augment Example 1 by assuming A = 1.1, α = 1 and β ∈ [0, 1]. In the case
of complementary agents, the optimal efforts are eC1 = e
C
2 =
α
2α+4β
= γ/2. One can
see that efforts are decreasing with β; that is, there is an incentive reversal. Let us
calculate total welfare
W = v12(e
C
1 , e
C
2 )− C1(e
C
1 )− C2(e
C
2 ) =
α
2γ
(4γ2 + 3(1− γ)(A− γ2)− γ3); (33)
and the principal’s payoff
P =
1
2
v1(e
C
1 ) +
1
2
v2(e
C
2 ) +
1
3
S(eC1 , e
C
2 ) =
α
2γ
(2γ2 + (1− γ)(A− γ2)). (34)
Figure 5 shows total welfare and the principal’s payoff, both as a function of β. When
β ≤ β1 the total welfare is maximized with the independent agents; complementary
agents produce more surplus in equilibrium if β > β1. The principal’s interests are
different however. When β ≤ β2, the principal prefers independent agents. It is only
when β > β2, that she would opt for complements. Importantly, for β1 ≤ β ≤ β2 the
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Figure 5: Total welfare and principal’s payoff
principal chooses independent agents even though complementary agents are welfare
maximizing choice, as described in Proposition 1. 
In Winter (2009), in contrast to our paper, effort is a discrete choice, which results
in a discontinuity in an agent’s best-response function. If another party’s payoff
increases sufficiently so that they have a dominant strategy to invest, an agent’s
best response might be to switch to low effort. In our model the agents’ choice is
continuous; incentive reversal arises due to the fact that efforts are substitutes at the
margin as we show in the Example above. Another important point of comparison is
that in our model incentive reversal may result in all agents decreasing their effort.
This is not possible in Winter (2009) where only a subset of agents decrease their
effort.
Given that it may decrease total welfare, incentive reversal is another illustration
of how the environment – here the production technology – can affect worker effort
and total welfare in a counter-intuitive way. In such a situation a principal, if they
could, would opt to not implement the more efficient production technology, realizing
its negative impact on overall output after changes in agents’ effort are accounted for.
5 Discussion and concluding comments
Getting the right team matters a great deal. Our analysis suggests that just choosing
the most natural team-mates might not be the best option. Rather, overall perfor-
mance might be better with agents who do not have an intrinsic connection or synergy.
This could be why teams are sometimes selected so as to include non-complementary
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members. It is often said that a champion team will beat a team of champions. Our
analysis suggests that even if a team of champions would perform better for a given
level of effort, a team of journeymen could outperform them precisely because the
less lauded unit has a greater incentive to put in effort (both in training and in the
game).
There are several key elements driving our result. First, there is contractual
incompleteness in the model, in that the agents cannot write contingent contracts
on either surplus or effort ex ante. If parties have the ability to contract on effort
ex ante, the first-best outcome can be achieved, and complementary workers will
always be used together. Second, we assume that the additional benefit of using two
complementary workers is decreasing in the effort or investment made; this means
that the marginal return from effort is lower for complementary workers than it is
for independent workers. The combination of these effects can together mean that
(second-best) surplus is higher with independent rather than complementary workers.
What the model suggests is that the true nature of complementary agents needs to
be considered in equilibrium – agents that end up producing more output might be
the team members who do not necessary intrinsically work best together. It is also
worth noting that while our focus has been on complementary versus independent
agents, the same point can be made for agents who are independent or substitute
workers; provided that the marginal return of effort is lower for independent agents,
the relative differences between the two options are qualitatively the same as the
complements/independents tradeoff we examined. That is, it could be that a firm or
principal chooses to hire substitute workers even though they intrinsically produce
less output for a given level of effort, provided this choice induces greater effort.14
There are many applications of the model. As noted, if complementary worker put
in less effort, a team of independents might produce greater net output. Similarly, if
incumbency reduces the incentive to invest, it could be that a policy of job rotation
increases total surplus (in consulting projects, musical productions or in research
projects). When choosing the composition of a team, an organization might wish to
choose workers that do not otherwise have a natural synergy between them. Note that
our result differs from the usual moral-hazard in teams result (see Holmstrom 1982
for example); we get under-investment in our model due to holdup regardless as to the
type of worker, but the under-investment problem is accentuated with complementary
workers.
Our framework also has implications for the allocation of decision-making rights.
A principal can have a tendency to choose independents too often; the agents them-
selves always prefer to have complementary team-mates, even if independents produce
greater net surplus. This suggests that when inducing greater effort (from indepen-
dents) is more important, the choice of team should be made centrally by the princi-
pal; on the other hand, when taking advantage of a natural synergy is relatively more
14One example we have in mind is a firm hiring a difficult or obnoxious worker – their presence
might naturally hinder output relative to a more congenial colleague, but this could be made up for
if their presence on the team creates an additional incentive to work harder.
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important, it might be advantageous for the principal to commit not to get involved
by having the decision decentralized to the agents themselves.
Finally, it is worth considering the implications of our model for the joint use (or
co-location) of assets. Take an example in which two assets can be co-located together
(perhaps geographically, such as in the same shopping mall). Each asset requires a
manager who can put in effort to increase the potential surplus generated. Given
co-location, there is some spillover between the two production units. The questions
arising in the context of our model are: (i) should these assets be complementary?;
and (ii) who should decide which assets are used? Each manager’s incentive to invest
is dependent on the characteristic of the other asset. Given our assumptions, inde-
pendent assets will induce greater effort from each manager. If the principal has the
decision-making rights on the assets to be combined, this decision is centralized (per-
haps under the auspices of one firm). The alternative is to decentralize this choice to
the unit managers. As noted above, centralization (common ownership) is preferred
when choosing independent assets is important. This is somewhat contradictory to
the standard prediction in the property-rights literature that complementary assets
should be owned together (Hart and Moore 1990, for example). This difference arises
because here we break the nexus between marginal and total returns (Assumptions 5
and 6 in Hart and Moore 1990).
Appendix
Derivation of the surplus shares for the principal and agent
Let us derive the ex ante payoffs given by the Shapley value for each team member
and the Principal with the help of equation 2. The payoffs of coalitions are as follows:
v(A,E1, E2) = v12, v(A,E1) = v1 and v(A,E2) = v2, while all other coalitions give
zero payoffs. Consequently,
B1 =
1
6
v1 +
1
3
(v12 − v2) =
1
2
v1 +
1
3
S, (35)
B2 =
1
6
v2 +
1
3
(v12 − v1) =
1
2
v2 +
1
3
S, (36)
and
BP =
1
6
v1 +
1
6
v2 +
1
3
v12 =
1
2
v1 +
1
2
v2 +
1
3
S. (37)

Proof of Proposition 2
First, from equation 9 if vI1 + v
I
2 − v
C
1 − v
C
2 <
2
3
SC , the principal will choose two
complementary agents. Second, from equation 20, when vI1 + v
I
2 − v
C
1 − v
C
2 < S
C +
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) it is efficient to choose complementary agents. The difference
between the right-hand side of these two equations is 1
3
SC +∆C1(e1) +∆C2(e2) > 0.
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Consequently, if equation 9 is satisfied, equation 20 is satisfied as well. This proves
the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 3
With complementary agents, the equilibrium levels of investment solve the following
first-order conditions:
1
2
v′i(ei) +
1
3
∂S(e1, e2)
∂ei
=
∂Ci(ei)
∂ei
, ∀ i = 1, 2. (6)
Given agents are complementary, ∂S(e1,e2)
∂ei
> 0. If there is a change so that for
some a > 1 either v′1(e1) ≡ av1(e1) or v
′
2(e2) ≡ av2(e2) or that S
′(e1, e2) ≡ aS(e1, e2),
this will strengthen incentives for agents to invest, leading to higher investment levels.
See Mai et al (2012) for an equivalent proof. 
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